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Tim TRAGEDY OF ANOTHER MINUTE:
IBWC MINUTE 308's FAILURE TO
MEND THE Rio GRANDE RIVER
Craig J. Pritzlaff*
"Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the com-
mons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all."'
I. INTRODUCTION
HE summer of 2002 marked another dry season for residents on
both sides of the Rio Grande River. Ten Texas communities along
the border with Mexico were under mandatory restrictions on
water use, and two other cities encouraged voluntary restrictions all in an
effort to conserve a scant resource. 2 According to the Palmer Drought
Severity Index, nine Texas counties bordering the Rio Grande River were
experiencing severe to extreme drought conditions. 3 Absent an influx of
tropical disturbances, the U.S. Climate Prediction Center expected the
droughts in these areas to continue in the months ahead.4
The prognosis was especially bleak for the lower Rio Grande River
Valley, which is home to extensive agricultural operations. 5 The valley
was in the midst of a "severe drought," and the soil conditions for crops
had been described as "excessively dry."' 6 Also, the international reser-
voirs along the Rio Grande River, Falcon Reservoir, and Amistad Reser-
voir all reached record lows in the summer of 2002. For example, Falcon
*Craig J. Pritzlaff is a 2004 JD candidate at the Dedman School of Law, Southern
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1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sa. 1243, 1244 (1968).
2. TEXAS COMM'N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIES EFFECTED BY
DROUGHT, available at http://www.tceq.state.tx.us (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
3. TEXAS WATER DEV. BD., PALMER DROUGHT SEVERITY INDEX BY TEXAS CLi-
MATIC DIVISIONS, available at http://www.texaswaterinfo.net (last visited Feb. 22,
2003).
4. CIMATE PREDICTION CENTER, U.S. SEASONAL DROUGHT OUTLOOK THROUGH
NOVEMBER 2002, available at http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov (last updated Aug. 29,
2002).
5. DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS COUNCIL, STATEWIDE DROUGHT SITUATION REPORT 2
(Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.txwin.net/dpc (last visited Feb. 22, 2003)
[hereinafter SITUATION REPORT].
6. Id
618 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 9
Reservoir's capacity plunged below 10 percent. 7 On the Mexican side of
the border, the situation remained bleak. Mexican reservoirs along
tributaries of the Rio Grande River (known as Rio Bravo in Mexico)
float at quarter capacities or less.8 The lack of storage capacity limited
irrigation efforts and crippled the region's agricultural economy. Accord-
ingly, the drought of the summer of 2002 was expected to cost Texas tens
of millions of dollars in agricultural losses, which resulted in the designa-
tion of three counties as eligible for disaster relief.9
Exacerbating the effects of the near-decade long drought, the popula-
tions on both sides of the border have steadily increased.' 0 If the growth
continues along the Texas side of the border, the population is expected
to double to over five million people by 2030.11 Meanwhile, on the Mexi-
can side of the border it could double to over four million by 2020.12
Poor sanitation, wasteful irrigation practices, and an unnecessarily com-
plex political management system are contributing to the region's water
woes.
13
The problems caused by the prolonged water shortage reached a head
in the summer of 2002, resulting in a strain in relations between the
United States and Mexico.14 Texas farmers and politicians remained es-
pecially angry over Mexico's continued failure to adhere to its interna-
tional obligations to share the waters of the Rio Grande River.15 Since
1992 Mexico has accumulated an aqua-debt of approximately 1.4 million
acre-feet of water with the United States. 16 Texas farmers desperately
needed this water to maintain their crops, and Mexico was simply unable
to provide the indebted water because of the dry conditions.17
In 1968 Garrett Hardin wrote an article describing the tragedy of the
7. Id.; see also TEXAS WATER DEV. BD., TEXAS DROUGHT CONDITIONS SUMMARY,
available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us (last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
8. Mary Kelly and Karen Chapman, Sharing the Waters 1 (May 17, 2002), available at
http://www.americaspolicy.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Sharing].
9. SITUATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 6; Blair Fannin, Drought Returns to Texas
Agriculture (June 12, 2002), available at http://agnews.tamu.edu/dailynews (last vis-
ited Feb. 22, 2003).
10. TEXAS COMM'N ON ENVTL. QUALITY, BORDER ISSUES, available at http://www.
tceq.state.tx.us (last visited Sept. 13, 2002).
11. Id
12. Id.
13. William A. Nitze, Meeting the Water Needs of the Border Region, 8 POLICY PAPERS
ON THE AMERICAS 1 (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.csis.org/Americas (last
visited Feb. 22, 2003).
14. See e.g., Steve Taylor, Lucio Trying to Set Meeting Between Fox and Farmers,
MCALLEN MONITOR, July 23, 2002, available at http://www.rioweb.org (last visited
Feb. 22, 2003) (stating how Mexico's President cancelled trips to Texas due to the
water crisis).
15. See Ramona Nye, Texas Tackles Water Dispute, available at http://www.agr.state.tx.
us (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (discussing how Texas politicians express dismay over
crisis and farmers stage protests); see also Utilization of Waters of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., T.S. No. 994
[hereinafter 1944 Water* Treaty].
16. See Sharing, supra note 8, at 1.
17. See generally id. at 1-2.
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commons.' Essentially, when humans are provided with a free resource
shared by all, with little or no incentives against overuse, then the re-
source will be absolutely consumed to the detriment of everyone. 19 The
Rio Grande River is a paradigm simulating this tragedy.
Absent any real incentives to adopt sustainable agriculture, Mexican
farmers in the state of Chihuahua 20 switched their crops to higher profit,
more water intensive strains than had been previously used in recent
years.21 With surface water levels in the area plunging, Mexican farmers
started mining groundwater resources in order to sustain crop irriga-
tion.22 Many of those groundwater aquifers connected to the waters that
feed the Rio Grande River and resulted in a contribution to the surface
water problems of the region. 23
Among the hodgepodge of agencies, commissions, and groups author-
ized to help administer the Rio Grande River, the most important is the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). 24 Though lim-
ited in its power, the IBWC is authorized to manage and administer the
waters of the Rio Grande River, and is in the best position to ensure
continued vitality of the border region's water.25 Regrettably, the IBWC
failed in the recent crisis because it passed on an opportunity to proac-
tively enforce Mexico's payment of its water debt to the United States.26
The IBWC's latest corrective minute is just another temporary stopgap
measure that fails to stem the worsening water woes of the Rio Grande
River.27
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Rio Grande River border waters have long been a source of dis-
pute between Mexico and the United States. 28 In the 1890s the United
States obstructed the flow of the upper Rio Grande River to such an
extent that the residents of Ciudad Juarez were essentially left with a dry
18. See Hardin, supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. Chihuahua is home of the Rio Conchos, one of the main tributaries of the south-
ern Rio Grande.
21. C. PARR RossoN ET AL., TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY, A PRELmNARY ASSESSMErNrr
OF CROP PRODUCTION AND ESTIMATED IRRIGATION WATER USE FOR CHIHUA-
HUA, MEXICO (May 2, 2002), available at http://www.cnas.tamu.edu/publications
(last visited Feb. 22, 2003).
22. Id. at 4.
23. See id. at 8.
24. See Mark A. Sinclair, Note, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement Between
Mexico and the United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Border-
lands, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 87, 110 (1986).
25. Id. at 111.
26. INT'L BOUNDARY WATER COMM'N, MINUTrE No. 308 UNITED STATES ALLOCA-
TION OF RIO GRANDE WATERS DURING THE LAST YEAR OF THE CURRENT CYCLE
(June 28, 2002), available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov (last visited Feb. 22, 2003)
[hereinafter MINUTrE 308].
27. Id.
28. See STEPHEN C. McCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 77
(2001).
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streambed. 29 Following its isolationist policies of the time, the United
States bucked international trends, and the U.S. Attorney General pro-
claimed that the United States could use water flowing within its territory
without any obligation to downstream residents of Mexico.30 In 1906 the
United States partially backed down from the harsh extremes of this doc-
trine by agreeing to equitably distribute the waters of the Rio Grande
River for purposes of irrigation. 31
Toward the middle of the twentieth century, the United States was em-
broiled in World War II, signaling an end to its isolationist policies. 32 As
a result of this new political stance, the United States renewed relations
with Mexico over the water problems plaguing their borders. 33 In 1944
the United States forever put to rest what was known as the Harmon
Doctrine and subsequently enacted the 1944 Water Treaty with Mexico to
quantify each nation's rights to the Rio Grande River waters. 34 Article 3
of the 1944 Water Treaty sets forth a series of water use preferences and
stresses the importance of solving border sanitation problems. Article 4
quantifies the amounts of Rio Grande River water allocated to each na-
tion from tributaries and jointly managed international reservoirs (con-
structed under the terms of Article 5). Further, Mexico must send the
United States no less than 350,000 acre-feet of water from its tributaries
annually. 35 The treaty uses five-year average cycles in water flow, and
any deficiencies due to "extraordinary drought or serious accident to the
hydraulic systems on the measured Mexican tributaries" are to be made
up in the subsequent five-year cycle. 36
The 1944 Water Treaty also renamed the previous commission in
charge of administering the border waters from the International Bound-
ary Commission to the IBWC.37 As such, the IBWC is vested with au-
thority to interpret the treaty and to regulate and administer the treaty's
terms. The IBWC's mission "is to apply the rights and obligations" that
Mexico and the United States assumed under the 1944 Water Treaty and
other subsequently related agreements "in a way that benefits the social
and economic welfare of the peoples on the two sides of the boundary
and improves relations between the two countries. ' 38 The IBWC imple-
ments its interpretative and regulatory authority through the use of Min-
utes.39 Once approved by each nation, the Minutes take "the form of a
29. See id. at 78.
30. See id. at 88 (also known as the Harmon Doctrine).
31. See id. at 102; see Distribution of Waters of the Rio Grande, May 21, 1906, U.S.-
Mex., T.S. No. 455.
32. See Sinclair, supra note 24, at 110.
33. See generally id.
34. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 15.
35. Id. at art. 4(B)(d).
36. Id.
37. Id. at art. 1.
38. International Boundary and Water Commission, The IBWC, Its Mission, Organi-
zation and Procedures for Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Mission].
39. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 25.
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legislative enactment. '40 Although in recent years a variety of other or-
ganizations assumed various oversight and financial functions, the IBWC




Since 1992 Mexico has not adhered to its duties under article 4 of the
1944 Water Treaty and thus far has accumulated a significant water debt
with the United States.42 In an attempt to solve this crisis, the IBWC
drafted Minute 308, which calls for immediate and long-term solutions to
the water dispute.43
In an effort to alleviate the immediate problems plaguing South Texas
farmers, Minute 308 includes Mexico's agreement to transfer 90,000 acre-
feet of water to the United States by October 26, 2002.44 This amount,
however, is discounted by 28,845 acre-feet for evaporation and other nat-
ural losses incurred during the transfer.4 5 Additionally, if Mexico is una-
ble to meet the delivery due to continued drought, the difference will be
credited.46 Essentially, Mexico must do the best it can, and if it is unable
to meet the goal, Mexico will still receive credit as if it had been met.
This is hardly the type of enforcement needed to prevent Hardin's trag-
edy of the commons. Even if Mexico delivers the full allotment or more,
the water will arrive at the end of the growing season, offering little sol-
ace to the plagued Lower Valley farmers.4 7 Also, 90,000 acre-feet of
water are a long way from addressing the 1.4 million acre-feet of cumula-
tive debt Mexico owes the United States. Contrary to the communiqud
issued by Mexico and the United States lauding the achievements of Min-
ute 308, the measure does not address "immediate needs" and makes lit-
tle headway in alleviating Mexico's overall water debt to the United
States.48
The remainder of Minute 308 addresses long-term planning, and finan-
cial and data management needs. Paragraph B includes recognition by
the IBWC of Mexico's commitment to modernize its irrigation systems to
achieve greater "efficiency in water use in the border cities."'49 Further-
more, the IBWC recognizes Mexico's financial commitment to the project
40. See Mission, supra note 38.
41. See generally Stephen P. Mumme, Managing Acute Water Scarcity on the U.S.-Mex-
ico Border: Institutional Issues Raised by the 1990's Drought, 39 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 149, 164-65 (1999).
42. See Sharing, supra note 8, at 1.
43. MINuTE 308, supra note 26.
44. Id. at I A(a).
45. Id. at I A(a)(3).
46. Id. at I A(a)(4).
47. See Taylor, supra note 14.
48. Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Joint Communiqu6 of the United States
and Mexico Concerning the Water Problem in the Rio Grande (June 29, 2002),
available at http://www.state.gov (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Press
Release].
49. MINuTE 308, supra note 26, at I B.
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and even proposes that Mexico "could" spend additional peso amounts
on irrigation projects to achieve an even greater conservation yield. 50
The Minute, however, merely takes note of governmental support to
commit the funds. The IBWC fails to (1) outline specific details of the
Mexican plans, (2) recommend specific areas to spend the money, and (3)
commit Mexico to specific timeframes for completion of the moderniza-
tion plans (outside of a broad four-year window of spending). Without
specific objectives for regulators in Mexico to achieve, any time and the
money allocated could be squandered in the regulator's search for direc-
tion. Finally, if the irrigation projects alluded to by the IBWC would re-
sult in a greater conservative yield, then Paragraph B should have used a
more directive "shall" instead of "could" in the Minute's language.
Paragraphs E and F of Minute 308 observe the support of both nations
to reform the institutions charged with financing border community water
projects. This item is merely recognition of prior agreements between the
two governments made in early 2002.51 It should reinforce those agree-
ments and encourage swift actions to free up funds for use. Additionally,
the IBWC assumed a proactive stance by declaring that the commission
would monitor the conservation projects and report the measures needed
to ensure that waters salvaged from the projects reach the Rio Grande
River.52
Minute 308's paragraphs B and G recognize the need for both govern-
ments to share scientific and hydrologic information, as well as data re-
lated to sustainable management of the Rio Grande River basin.
Paragraph G appears to acknowledge the need for one agency (the
IBWC) to serve as a forum for the collection and exchange of the vast
array of scientific data collected for development of sustainable manage-
ment practices. Additionally, Paragraph G, Points 1 and 3 strengthen the
IBWC's management role in the Rio Grande River basin and appear to
set it as the central forum for the collection of information from outside
agencies and groups related to sustainable management and drought
management planning. Yet, in Paragraph D, the Minute only recognizes
that both governments have committed to sharing hydrologic data and
fails to expressly require the governments to share or even indicate ap-
propriate means to share the data. Reading the paragraphs together,
however, it would seem logical that the IBWC will be the forum through
which information exchange will flow because hydrologic data is critical
to drought management and sustainable management planning. Addi-
tionally, Paragraph G, Point 3 indicates that the IBWC will create an In-
ternational Advisory Council that will coordinate the exchange of data
between the two countries.
Unfortunately, the creation of this data forum is subject to financial
50. Id. at I C.
51. See Press Release, supra note 48.
52. MiNrE 308, supra note 26, at I F.
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and personnel commitments from the United States and Mexico.53 That
is where the Minute potentially fails. Exact monetary commitments are
not etched out, and the IBWC neglects to establish a specific date for
creation of the data exchange council. Additionally, it remains unclear
whether the IBWC will now serve as a central data clearinghouse to coor-
dinate, collect, and analyze the information, or if the IBWC will merely
serve as a conduit through which information will flow.
One of the biggest problems perpetuating the Rio Grande Rivers water
woes is the lack of coordination among the various groups that study the
Rio Grande River, which results in duplicate efforts.54 If the IBWC
served as a central data clearinghouse, then it could more easily identify
data gaps and duplication. The IBWC could then direct the focus of the
studies to fill the gaps and help coordinate groups to prevent data dupli-
cation. Minute 308 falls short in outlining these issues and leaves the
problem for another day or crisis.
Finally, Paragraph G, Point 2 takes note of the need for a "bi-national
summit of experts and water users from each country" to develop a bi-
national sustainable management plan.55 The paragraph also notes that
the United States and Mexico will consider the summit's recommenda-
tions. Although studies and summits are laudable, the problems plaguing
the Rio Grande River have been ongoing for over a century. 56 The time
for half-measures is over. Given the public attention to the current crisis,
the IBWC should have capitalized on the situation and outlined a sustain-
able management plan for Mexico and the United States to consider.
The IBWC's goal is to ensure vitality of a shared resource. The sharing
of current scientific data is an integral step to achieving that goal within
the spirit of the 1944 Water Treaty and sustainable development in gen-
eral.57 In drafting Minute 308, however, the IBWC lost a golden oppor-
tunity in the midst of a political crisis, to take proactive action to
permanently solve the water problems of the Rio Grande River. The
IBWC merely writes empty words and puts off immediate action in favor
of perpetual planning and reorganization.
IV. CONCLUSION
In 1968 Hardin warned of a tragedy of the commons. 58 In 2002 his
words have begun to ring true as the IBWC is perpetuating a tragedy of
the commons in the Rio Grande River. The Rio Grande River has not
reached the Gulf of Mexico in any meaningful way in years and a large
sandbar has even formed at its mouth to the Gulf of Mexico.59 Mexican
53. Id. at I1 G(3).
54. See Nitze, supra note 13, at 14; see also Mumme, supra note 41, at 162.
55. Mn'UrrE 308, supra note 26, at 9G.
56. See McCAFFREY, supra note 28, at 77.
57. See Mission, supra note 38.
58. See Hardin, supra note 1.
59. See Sharing, supra note 8, at 1; See also INT'L BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM'N,
Rio GRANDE DISCHARGE PROFILE, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov (last vis-
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farmers have recently realized that they can freely abuse the diminishing
water supply without any real consequences.6° Already, Mexico has ac-
cumulated approximately 1.4 million acre-feet of water debt to the
United States. 61 They are adopting unsustainable agricultural practices in
favor of short-term economic gains. Regrettably, this short-term gain
could ultimately result in long-term disaster.62
Management of a shared, finite resource requires strong proactive
leadership with enforcement power. The IBWC's failure to satisfactorily
resolve a politically sensitive crisis highlights the inadequacies of the ex-
isting legal framework that controls the Rio Grande River. In 2002 the
situation reached the executive branches of both countries and interfered
with negotiation on other key issues in the wake of the terrorist attacks
on September 11th. 63 Prolonged continuance of unsustainable practices
in the region, combined with poor management and enforcement of ex-
isting legal agreements will only worsen Mexico's water debt and perpet-
uate future political disputes.
The IBWC can prevent this by strongly adhering to the spirit of the
1944 Water Treaty as well as its stated mission. Currently, the IBWC is
not acting "in a way that benefits the social and economic welfare" of the
border populations. 64 The 1944 Water Treaty vested the IBWC with an
opportunity to respond to changing conditions through its ad-hoc system
of Minutes. 65 Minute 308 was on the right track, but fell short in several
key areas. First, the IBWC did not adequately address Mexico's default
of the 1944 Water Treaty terms. Minute 308's response to Mexico's water
debt was to force them to payback a mere 6 percent of its debt. After
discounting losses due to evaporation and infiltration, only about 4.5 per-
cent will reach South Texas farmers.66 The IBWC's refusal to proactively
enforce the 1944 Water Treaty renders it nearly meaningless. If the terms
of the 1944 Water Treaty are not equitable, then they should be renegoti-
ated. Until then its terms should be strictly enforced by the agency
charged to do so.
Second, the IBWC failed to provide specific direction about how Mex-
ico should spend the money it committed to capital improvements.67 The
Minute merely recognizes Mexico's commitment to spend the funds, and
it only suggests broad areas where the funds could be spent. Although
the commitment of money is laudable, after the default of the 1944 Water
Treaty it seems that Mexico should receive specific directions on how to
ited Feb. 22, 2003) (discharge at Brownsville is zero; Note also the IBWC is plan-
ning to dredge the sandbar and has a pending permit application with the United
States Army Corps of Engineers to do so).
60. See RossoN ET AL., supra note 21, at 2.
61. See Sharing, supra note 8, at 1.
62. See generally RoSSON ET AL., supra note 21.
63. See Taylor, supra note 14.
64. See Mission, supra note 38.
65. See Sinclair, supra note 24, at 115.
66. See MrNuTE 308, supra note 26, at I A.
67. Id. at $I B, C.
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alleviate its water debt. By ensuring the committed funds are spent on
specifically designated projects that will improve the efficiency and col-
lection of Mexico's water use, future growth of Mexico's water debt might
be mitigated. For example, funds could be allocated to immediate solu-
tions such as offering farmers incentives to plant drought tolerant crops
instead of irrigation intensive cash crops.
Third, Minute 308 did not adequately delineate how the IBWC will
serve as a central forum for information exchange and consolidation.68
From water level data to environmental quality data, the IBWC must
serve as a central data clearinghouse for all information related to water
management of the Rio Grande.69 Instead of recognizing that Mexico
and the United States will commit funding and personnel to aid the
IBWC in this effort, the Minute should have been more specific and in-
stead imitated Paragraph C, which specifically designated the funds Mex-
ico planned to dedicate toward capital conservation projects.
Additionally, the Minute should have included the exact date the new
Interagency Advisory Council would be formed along with its specific
goals and role.
Finally, the IBWC remains content to focus its efforts toward contin-
ued study and perpetual planning. 70 The problems of the prolonged
drought are known and solutions abound.71 The IBWC is in the ideal
position to take the lead role in mandating the construction and mainte-
nance of conservation projects. In fact, Minute 308's Paragraph F ap-
pears to recognize this position by establishing the IBWC as a watchdog
over newly implemented conservation works. The IBWC should also di-
rect the creation of new projects. Such projects could include directing
funding for creation of new agricultural irrigation methods, continued
construction of comprehensive urban centralized wastewater systems,
and adoption of non-point source discharge management controls in rural
and urban areas to help preserve water quality.72 The IBWC could en-
force the timetables for completion of the projects by withholding water
allotments from each nation.
The IBWC had a golden opportunity and political spotlight to come up
with concrete enforceable language to solve the ongoing problems. In-
stead, they opted for small stopgap measures and overly broad language
with no enforceable milestones or financial incentives for Mexico to
proactively mitigate its water debt. By calling for the drafting of more
plans and negotiations, precious time is lost from solving the on-going
problem. Although diplomacy sometimes necessitates the use of broad
language, when millions of people's lives, livelihood, and pleasure is de-
pendent on a finite resource like the Rio Grande River, hard-line mea-
68. Id. at 11 D, G(1), G(3).
69. See generally Mumme, supra note 41, at 163.
70. See MINUTE 308, supra note 26, at G.
71. See generally Nitze, supra note 13.
72. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 15, at art. 3 (water uses must "give preferential
attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems").
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sures, management, and strong language are needed to ensure the
resource's vitality. The waters of the Rio Grande River are a dwindling
resource, and the more time spent planning for solutions only means
more water will drain out of the bathtub without return.
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